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This paper studies the effects of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill 
structure of firms. The study verifies whether controlling for both 
activities in one model alters previous empirical studies, which controlled 
only for one factor in their models; whether controlling for destination 
country of outsourcing and offshoring brings new insights; and whether 
controlling for occupational level of workers when defining skills brings 
additional contribution to the results. Regarding the latter, besides the 
conventional approach for defining skills, i.e. the educational level, skills 
are also defined by three major occupational groups; Managers, 
Professionals and Technicians. To empirically estimate the 
abovementioned hypotheses, a matched employer-employee dataset for 
Slovenian manufacturing and service firms during 1997 to 2010, and the 
methods for panel data analysis were used. Results of the model on 
average show a positive impact of offshoring on the skill share of firms, 
while the results for outsourcing are uncommon. When controlling for 
high- and low-income countries, the results for manufacturing firms show 
a positive and similar effect of offshoring to both groups of countries on 
the share of skilled employees. In service firms, results show a weaker 
impact of offshoring to high-income countries on the relative 
employment of skilled, compared to offshoring to low-income countries. 
When taking into account also occupational levels for defining skills, the 
results show that the impact of education differs between occupational 
groups, indicating that firms differentiate between more and less 
educated individuals within the same occupational group. 
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Global value chains and the effects of outsourcing and 
offshoring on firms: Evidence from matched firm-employee 
data 
1 Introduction 
Globalisation has changed the world dramatically in the most recent decades. 
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade liberalization and 
technology improvements led to lower trade barriers and to the drop of 
transportation and communication costs (IMF, 2013). In line with these changes, 
transnational companies (TNCs) change and adjust the structure and organization 
of their value added activities, where offshoring and outsourcing are among their 
main methods of strategic positioning. Forecasts on increasing internationalization 
specify that firms will carry out even more of their activities outside of their 
enterprises in the future; for instance through increasing foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows, or through increasing foreign affiliate activity (UNCTAD, 2013). 
By evaluating the effect of offshoring and outsourcing on the skill structure of 
firms, empirical studies confirm an important impact of offshoring and outsourcing 
on the skill structure of firms in developed countries. On average, studies conclude 
that offshoring and outsourcing have a positive impact on employment of skilled 
labour. Among these are for example Mion and Zhu (2013), studying the effects of 
Chinese imports on Belgian manufacturing firms, Hijzen et al. (2005), studying the 
UK market, Strauss-Kahn (2003), studying French manufacturing industries, Egger 
and Egger (2003), studying the impact of trade liberalization between Western and 
Eastern Europe, where the country of interest is Austria, and Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996), studying the United States labour market. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) 
demonstrate that increased import competition from low-wage countries presents 
an important channel which transfers labour demand towards more skilled workers. 
Hijzen et al. (2005) explain this is a consequence of relocating the unskilled labour-
intensive production to countries, abundant with unskilled labour, whereas high-
technology stages of productions continue to be produced in developed countries. 
The motivation for this paper draws upon the forecasts, made by UNCTAD, 
which assign an even greater role to offshoring and outsourcing activities in the 
future, and by adding to the existing evidence on the effects of outsourcing and 
offshoring on the labour market. First aim of the paper is to include both measures 
of strategic positioning of firms, outsourcing and offshoring, in one model and to 
test whether their positive effect on the relative employment of skilled is present 
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also when accounting for both factors in one model. To the best of my knowledge, 
previous empirical studies took into account only one of the measures in the models 
at a time. However, since separate models of the previous studies confirmed the 
positive impact of offshoring and outsourcing on the labour demand, and since both 
are expected to increase in the future, I believe it is important to account for both 
aspects in one model. 
Second aim is to test whether offshoring and outsourcing from high-income coun-
tries have a different impact on the skill share of firms as compared to offshoring 
and outsourcing from low-income countries. It is important to make this distinction 
since aforementioned studies indicate shifts of unskilled-intensive parts of produc-
tion to countries, abundant with relatively less skilled labour. Therefore, it is es-
sential to account for the destination country of outsourcing and offshoring, as this 
enables new interpretation of results and controls for potential differences of part-
ner’s performance. Regarding the abovementioned studies, one would expect that 
outsourcing from high-income countries and offshoring to low-income countries 
would have a positive impact on the relative employment of skilled workers. The 
reasoning behind this claim is that outsourcing from high-income countries enables 
firms to have an access to technologically more advanced intermediate inputs, 
which in turn demand employment of highly skilled workers. On the other hand, 
offshoring to low-income countries is expected to shift some of the more manually-
intensive parts of production abroad and to keep the high value added departments 
in domestic country (as for example research, sales, marketing, finance, etc.). 
Final aim is to test the robustness of these results to a more detailed definition 
of skills, which takes into account also occupational classification of workers and 
not only the level of their formal education. It is important to test this since workers 
gain their skills not only by formal education but also through various forms of 
vocational trainings and throughout their working career. One would expect that 
taking into consideration also occupational classification when defining skills should 
further increase the explanatory power of the model. 
To sum up, the empirical analysis addresses the following hypotheses: (i) control-
ling for both phenomena – offshoring and outsourcing – in one model alters previous 
empirical studies, which control only for one factor in their model; (ii) controlling 
for destination country of outsourcing and offshoring brings new insights to the 
results; and (iii) controlling for occupational level of workers when defining skills 
brings additional contribution to the results of the paper. 
To assess the effects of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill structure of firms, 
a matched firm-employee panel dataset for Slovenian firms in the period from 1997 
to 2010 is used. Empirical analysis is split in two parts. The basic model analyses 
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the impact of offshoring and outsourcing on the skill structure of firms, using a 
conventional definition of skilled workers, which defines skills only by the level of 
formal education. In the model extensions, the analysis first differentiates between 
offshoring to and outsourcing from high- and low-income countries. Additional ex-
tension of the model introduces a novel definition of skills, which takes into account 
not only formal educational level of workers but also their occupational classifica-
tion. Taking into account statistically significant results, I find that offshoring has 
a positive impact on the relative employment of tertiary educated workers in man-
ufacturing firms, while the results for outsourcing are uncommon. When controlling 
also for the income height of countries, offshoring to low- and high-income countries 
shows a similar and positive impact on the relative employment of skilled in man-
ufacturing firms. Furthermore, when controlling also for occupational level when 
defining skills, results indicate that offshoring to high-income countries has a 
stronger impact on the relative employment of Professionals in manufacturing firms 
than offshoring to low-income countries. On the other hand, results for service firms 
show that offshoring to high-income countries has a weaker impact on the relative 
employment of Technicians, compared to offshoring to low-income countries. When 
combining both definitions of skilled; i.e. educational and occupational level, the 
results for manufacturing firms do not change significantly, while the results in 
service firms show that offshoring to low- and high-income countries has a similar 
and positive impact on the relative employment of tertiary educated Managers. The 
results for outsourcing are on average not statistically significant. The impact of 
education therefore differs between occupational groups, indicating that firms dif-
ferentiate between employing different workers within the same occupational group, 
which is true especially for Managers in service firms. In addition, this also confirms 
that firms have greater incentives for hiring more educated workers. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, a brief 
summary of the relevant literature is given. Section three introduces the methodol-
ogy used in the empirical part, whereas section four describes the data and presents 
descriptive statistics. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are included 
in section five. The last section summarises and concludes. 
2 Literature review 
Literature review starts with a brief discussion on the theoretical models, which 
explore effects of outsourcing and offshoring on the labour demand. Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) developed a theoretical model that studies the impacts of 
the falling costs of offshoring on the factor prices in the home country. Authors 
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differentiate between trade in goods, which is the conventional meaning of trade, 
and trade in tasks, which relates to adding a value to goods in different locations. 
The model concludes that offshoring influences firms’ performance positively, since 
it allows them to hire some factors abroad at a lower price. On the other hand, 
offshoring also brings costs as the monitoring and management of workers is hin-
dered due to long distances. In the model, authors take into account the effects of 
trade in tasks, by controlling also for skilled workers. Their model indicates that 
trade in tasks gives rise to shared gains for all domestic factors (Grossman, & Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008). 
Another theoretical model was formed by Mitra and Ranjan (2009), who study 
the relation between offshoring and unemployment, where they define offshoring as 
the sourcing of inputs from foreign countries. The model differentiates between two 
situations; one is when the labour is perfectly mobile and another when this is not 
the case. In the case of perfect labour mobility, offshoring causes wages to increase 
and unemployment to decrease, whereas in the case of imperfect labour mobility, 
there is a possibility for unemployment to increase in the offshoring sector, but at 
the same time, the unemployment decreases in the other sector. 
Finally, Egger and Egger (2003) developed a theoretical model, in which they 
focus on a small country case, treated as home country, which produces industrial-
ized good and has a possibility to outsource a low-skilled part of its production to 
low-wage foreign countries. Results indicate that outsourcing increases with the 
decrease of trade barriers. In a competitive labour market framework, outsourcing 
increases relative wages of high-skilled labour, while it does not affect relative em-
ployment. However, in a unionized framework, outsourcing increases both, relative 
wages and relative employment of high-skilled labour in the domestic country. 
Compared to rather scarce theoretical analyses on the effects of outsourcing and 
offshoring on the labour market, empirical studies are more abundant. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996, 1999) analyse the impact of outsourcing in the United States. Results 
of their earlier paper point to an increase of the relative demand for skilled labour 
due to increased outsourcing. However, the result does not hold for all time periods 
(Feenstra, & Hanson, 1996). In their later paper, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) focus 
on comparing the effects of outsourcing and technology on wages. They conclude 
that both phenomena impact the relative wages of non-production workers posi-
tively, where the impact of technology is larger, compared to outsourcing activities 
(Feenstra, & Hanson, 1999). 
Amiti and Wei (2005a, 2005b) explore the effects of service outsourcing and off-
shoring in the UK and US, respectively. For the UK market, the authors find that 
job growth and outsourcing are not negatively correlated at the sectorial level 
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(Amiti, & Wei, 2005a), whereas for the US market, the authors find a positive effect 
of offshoring on productivity, while the effect on employment differs according to 
the disaggregation of industries. More precisely, when industries are finely disaggre-
gated, the results point to a negative effect. On the other hand, when industries are 
defined on a broader level, the negative effect disappears. This leads to a conclusion 
that, although offshoring might affect employment negatively within industries, 
dismissed workers renew their employment in other growing industries (Amiti, & 
Wei, 2005b). 
Hijzen et al. (2005) also examine the effects of outsourcing on the UK labour 
market. Results indicate that outsourcing affects the demand for unskilled labour 
negatively and together with technological change leads to changes in the skill 
structure of manufacturing industries (Hijzen et al., 2005). Parallel conclusions on 
the effect of increased outsourcing were made by Strauss-Kahn (2003), who con-
cludes that outsourcing influences the relative employment of unskilled workers in 
French manufacturing industries negatively. In addition, Egger and Egger (2003) 
empirically tested the effect of outsourcing in Austria, as a consequence of trade 
liberalisation in the Central and Eastern Europe. Authors find that outsourcing 
increases relative employment of high-skilled labour (Egger, & Egger, 2003). 
Furthermore, while Michel and Rycx (2009) find no major influence of materials 
or business services offshoring on the employment in Belgian firms, they highlight 
the importance of distinguishing between manufacturing and service industries. 
Traditionally, only manufacturing industries were related to offshoring, since their 
products are easily tradable. However, improvements in information and commu-
nication technologies had a significantly positive impact on offshoring in service 
industries (Michel, & Rycx, 2009). It is therefore important to compare the impact 
of outsourcing and offshoring in both, manufacturing and service firms. This was 
confirmed also by De Backer and Yamano (2012), who compare the increase of 
offshoring in different countries, where the analysis was done separately for manu-
facturing and service industries. Although offshoring increased in the observed pe-
riod from 1995 to 2005 in both, manufacturing and service industries, the increase 
was on average bigger in the latter. Importing intermediates from abroad is however 
on average still more important in manufacturing industries (De Backer, & Yamano, 
2012). Similar conclusions were made by Horgos (2006), using German data. Author 
concludes that outsourcing activities are concentrated in high-skilled manufacturing 
industries, while service industries show the highest increase of outsourcing activi-
ties (Horgos, 2006). 
A noteworthy restraint of empirical studies, presented in previous paragraphs, is 
in the type of data used. The studies used data, disaggregated only at the industry 
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level and therefore could not control for firm-specific and individual-specific char-
acteristics that may have an impact on the skill structure of firms. Moreover, iden-
tifying the labour demand curve is more challenging when using industry-level data 
(Hijzen, & Swaim, 2010). Since firm-level data became more accessible in the recent 
years, current studies estimate the effects of outsourcing and offshoring on the la-
bour market also in terms of firm-level data. 
Konings and Murphy (2006) evaluate substitution of workers between parents 
and their affiliates in European multinational enterprises. Due to the lack of infor-
mation on the skill composition of workers, authors were not able to estimate the 
effect of outsourcing on the skill demand of workers, but were able to differentiate 
between regions with different wage costs. Contrary to the common beliefs, their 
results indicate to employment relocations between parent firms and their affiliates, 
both based in the North EU, but they find no significant employment flows between 
the parent and affiliates, based in the South EU, and Central and Eastern Europe 
(Konings and Murphy, 2006). 
In another study using firm-level data, Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) differentiate 
between types of imports – imports of finished goods and imports of intermediate 
goods, which they define as offshoring. They find a strong and negative correlation 
between imports and job destruction, where this impact is especially strong for 
imports of finished goods, imports from low-wage countries and for larger firms. 
They also confirm some previous findings that these changes on average occur 
within firms. Controlling for innovation does not alter their result (Biscourp, & 
Kramarz, 2007). Furthermore, by estimating data on German manufacturing firms, 
Wagner (2011) confirms there is a self-selection of firms into offshoring. The anal-
ysis concludes that these firms are larger, more productive and more human capital 
intensive. Moreover, author also confirms some previous findings, which do not find 
a large negative effect of offshoring on employment (Wagner, 2011). 
Focusing on trade liberalisation in China after its accession to the World Trade 
Organisation, Bloom et al. (2011) evaluate how this event affected technical change 
in European economies. They find technology improvements and productivity in-
creases in industries, mostly affected by the increased Chinese competition, while 
the effect on labour demand and survival probability varies across firms. Specifically, 
although increased Chinese competition did not affect labour demand and survival 
probability in high-tech firms, they both decreased in low-tech firms. On the other 
hand, import competition from developed countries did not affect innovation 
(Bloom et al., 2011). 
Mion and Zhu (2013) also studied the effects of Chinese imports, where their 
main interests were Belgian manufacturing firms and Belgian labour market. The 
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authors differentiate between imports of final and intermediate goods, and find that 
importing from China hurts firms in the low-tech industries. Contrary to Bloom et 
al. (2011) they find that import competition from China does not have a negative 
effect on the survival of Belgian manufacturing firms. On the whole, competition 
in the Belgian market has increased through increased Chinese competition and 
was followed by reduces in firm employment growth, and upgrades in technology 
and skill structure (Mion, & Zhu, 2013). 
Similar conclusions were made by Lo Turco and Maggioni (2012), who focused 
on the effects of offshoring on the labour demand in Italian manufacturing firms, 
where they also differentiated between source countries. The authors conclude that 
importing intermediates from high-income countries does not affect employment, 
while the effects on the employment are negative when firms import intermediates 
from low-income countries. 
Using Danish data and focusing on the effects of offshoring on wages, Hummels 
et al. (2014) find that offshoring has a positive impact on wages of skilled labour 
and a negative impact on the wages of unskilled labour. 
To sum up the findings of presented studies in this section, liberalising trade with 
developing countries brings opportunities for cost reductions and technology im-
provements, while on the other hand it also presents threats to labour markets in 
the developed countries. However, the majority of studies conclude this threat is 
not large and is usually concentrated on the low-skilled employees. Also important 
is the emphasis made in several papers (see for example De Backer, & Yamano, 
2012; Michel, & Rycx, 2009; and Horgos, 2006) on the significance of differentiating 
between manufacturing and service industries, as well as the importance of using 
firm-level data (Hijzen, & Swaim, 2010). 
This paper employs a matched firm-employee panel dataset for Slovenian firms, 
to evaluate how significant is the impact of offshoring and outsourcing on the skill 
structure of firms. More precisely, the aim of the study is to make a thorough 
analysis of the impact of offshoring and outsourcing on the skill structure of Slove-
nian firms in the period from the year 1997 to 2010. To obtain more detailed results 
and to add to the existing evidence in this field of knowledge, a new dimension is 
introduced when defining skills, by including information on occupational structure 
of workers. To my best knowledge, previous analyses differentiated between skilled 
and unskilled workers only by looking at their educational attainment or by differ-
entiating between production and non-production workers. However, it is important 
to take into account also occupational classification of workers, as skills can be 
acquired through employment and experience, and not only through formal educa-
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tion. Specifically, workers who do not have tertiary education also occupy im-
portant positions in firms, while tertiary educated workers also occupy less demand-
ing positions. The latter is especially true for younger workers at the beginning of 
their career path, whereas the former is true for experienced workers, who did not 
have opportunities to achieve higher formal education, but took an important po-
sition in a firm owing to their capabilities. Moreover, the analysis is further broad-
ened by differentiating between occupational groups that define skills in order to 
make an even more thorough analysis. With this extension, I evaluate how employ-
ment effects of offshoring and outsourcing differ by task characteristics. Finally, 
while the bulk of analyses were usually concentrated on the effects of only offshoring 
or only outsourcing, it is important to study both factors in one model in order to 
increase the goodness of fit of the model. Therefore, both factors – offshoring and 
outsourcing – are included to the analysis. In addition, I also differentiate between 
outsourcing from high- and low-income countries and between offshoring to high- 
and low-income countries as this differentiation brings new information and deepens 
the analysis. While Lo Turco and Maggioni (2012) also differentiated between out-
sourcing from high- and low-income countries, they did not account for offshoring, 
skilled workers or service firms in their analysis. 
As already presented in the introduction, paper’s main aim is to test whether: (i) 
including both phenomena – offshoring and outsourcing – in one model alters pre-
vious empirical studies, which control only for one factor in their model and on 
average find a positive impact of the particular factor on the relative employment 
of skilled; (ii) controlling for destination country of outsourcing and offshoring 
brings new insights; especially whether outsourcing from high-income countries and 
offshoring to low-income countries has a positive impact on the relative employment 
of skilled workers; (iii) including the information on the occupational structure of 
workers when defining skills brings additional contribution to the results of the 
paper. 
3 Methodology 
This section presents the methodology and sets up a framework and specification 
of the model, which will serve for empirically testing the preceding postulates. Since 
it can be deduced from the presented literature that definitions of outsourcing and 
offshoring vary significantly across different studies, this section first presents the 
definitions of outsourcing and offshoring, used in the analysis. Framework and spec-
ification of the basic and extended models are presented next. 
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Definitions of outsourcing and offshoring differ widely in the literature. Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) define outsourcing as the import of intermediate inputs by do-
mestic firms, whereas in their more recent paper (Feenstra, & Hanson, 1999), they 
introduce two measures of outsourcing. First is the ratio between imported inter-
mediate inputs, relative to total expenditure of non-energy intermediates in each 
industry, and the second is defined as inputs that are purchased from the same 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry as the good being pro-
duced (Feenstra, & Hanson, 1999). Many of the papers follow these definitions and 
methodology. Similar definition for outsourcing is also used in the recent reports of 
IMF (2013) and UNCTAD (2013), which define outsourcing as purchasing inter-
mediates from another firm, rather than producing them within the firm. Taking 
into account these definitions, outsourcing in this analysis is defined as the ratio 
between the value of intermediate imports and the value of total material costs of 
a firm i in year t: 
 푂푢푡푠표푢푟푐푖푛푔푖푡 =
퐼푛푡푒푟푚푒푑푖푎푡푒 푖푚푝표푟푡푠푖푡
푇표푡푎푙 푚푎푡푒푟푖푎푙 푐표푠푡푠푖푡
 (1) 
where intermediate imports are defined according to the assigned Broad Economic 
Categories (BEC) codes. Under BEC classification, goods can be classified in three 
categories; capital, intermediate, and consumption goods. 
Besides estimating the effects of outsourcing, this analysis also takes into account 
the effects of offshoring. For the latter, I again follow the definition of IMF (2013) 
and UNCTAD (2013), which define offshoring either as the process of relocating 
part or all activities to another firm, located overseas, or as foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI). For estimating the effect of offshoring, I take into account the dataset 
from the Bank of Slovenia, which comprises the information on the FDI flows for 
every Slovenian firm. This dataset gathers information on the volume of the FDI 
and destination country of the investment. Offshoring is denoted by introducing a 
dummy variable, indicating the existence of firm’s FDI flows. 
3.1 Framework and specification of the basic model 
This part mainly follows the theoretical framework, introduced by Hummels et al. 
(2014). The production function of a firm i in year t is defined as: 
 푌푖푡 = 퐴푖푡푓(퐾푖푡,퐻푖푡, 퐶푖푡) (2) 
where the dependent variable, Yit, is the output,  Ait is productivity, Kit is the 
capital, Hit is skilled labour, and Cit is a composite input, consisting of domestic and 
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foreign inputs. The latter relate to outsourcing and/or offshoring activities and the 
former relate to unskilled labour and domestic inputs. As presented in the literature 
review, offshoring and outsourcing activities have distinct impacts on skilled and 
unskilled labour, where the impact on the skilled labour is on average positive, 
while the impact on the unskilled labour is on average negative (see for example 
Hummels et al., 2014; Mion, & Zhu, 2013; Hijzen et al., 2005; Strauss-Kahn, 2003; 
Egger, & Egger, 2003; and Feenstra, & Hanson, 1996). Since both factors affect the 
labour demand of firms, the model of Hummels et al. (2014) is extended by includ-
ing also domestic inputs and offshoring into the model. 
To implement the theoretical model in the data, I introduce Pit as a reduced-form 
of the demand for firm i’s products, divide the variables in the model (2) by the 
total number of firms’ employees, separate the international activities of firms into 
offshoring and outsourcing, take logarithms and rearrange the equation so that the 
variable of interest on the left is skill share of firms: 
 
−훽(훽 − 1) ln 퐻푖푡 = ln푃푖푡 + ln 퐴푖푡 + 훼 ln 퐾푖푡 +
                       + (1 − 훼 − 훽)ln(푂푢푡푖푡 + 푂푓푓푖푡 + 퐿푖푡 + 퐶푖푡)  
(3) 
Furthermore, following Hummels et al. (2014), the logarithm of the average wage 
level (Wit-s), and the logarithm of the value of exports (Xit-s) in the firm i and year 
t are added to the model. The latter is introduced in order to capture time varying 
shocks to demand for firms’ output. Detailed derivation of the model is enclosed in 
the Appendix. 
After rearranging, the empirical model hence becomes: 
 
푆푘푖푙푙_푠ℎ푎푟푒푖푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푂푢푡푖푡 + 훽2푂푓푓푖푡 + 훽3푋푖푡 + 훽4퐴푖푡 +
                    + 훽5퐾푖푡 + 훽6푊푖푡 + 훽7퐶푖푡 + 푇푖푚푒푡 + 퐼푛푑푡 + 휀푖푡  
(4) 
where the dependent variable Skill_shareit is the logarithm of the ratio between 
skilled employees and the total number of employees in the firm i and year t. Sim-
ilarly to Hummels et al. (2014), skilled workers in the first part of the analysis are 
defined as tertiary educated workers, i.e. if they attain some form of college degree, 
which is normally at least 14 years of school attainment in Slovenia. As already 
explained, outsourcing (Outit) is defined as the share of intermediate imports in the 
total material costs, and offshoring (Offit) as the dummy variable, controlling for 
the outward FDI. Other explanatory variables are the following: Xit is a logarithm 
of the value of exports, Ait is a measure of productivity, Kit is a logarithm of capital 
per employee, Wit is a logarithm of the average annual wage level, and Cit is a 
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logarithm of the domestic cost level in the firm i and year t. To increase the sensi-
tivity of results, two different measures of productivity are used; value added per 
employee and total factor productivity. Domestic cost level (Cit) was calculated as 
the difference between the total level of material costs and imports. Variable Timet 
controls for year specific effects and Indt denotes industry dummy variables (2-digit 
NACE rev. 1 industries). 
Following Hummels et al. (2014), outsourcing, exports and levels of domestic 
costs are not scaled by firm size in order to enhance explanatory value of the model. 
More precisely, changes in the firm size might be the consequence of the changes 
in these variables. Instead, the model has been estimated with and without firm 
size as one of the explanatory variables. 
3.2 Extensions of the model 
Formation of the extended model is based on the model, presented in the previous 
subsection. First, the model is extended by differentiating between outsourcing from 
high- and low-income countries, and offshoring to high- and low-income countries. 
As mentioned in the literature review, Lo Turco and Maggioni (2012) also con-
trolled for the origin of countries when analysing the impact of outsourcing on the 
labour demand in Italian manufacturing firms. Authors emphasize it is important 
to differentiate between high- and low-income countries, since different origins of 
outsourcing can point to a different performance level of firms. I add to the analysis 
of Lo Turco and Maggioni (2012) by controlling for skills, and including also service 
firms and offshoring into the model. Countries are classified as high- or low-income 
according to the definitions, made by the World Bank, where the low-income, lower-
middle-income and upper-middle-income economies for a particular year are as-
signed as low-income countries, and high-income economies as high-income coun-
tries (WB, 2015). 
The extended model, controlling for outsourcing from low- and high-income coun-
tries and offshoring to low- and high-income countries is the following: 
 
푆푘푖푙푙_푠ℎ푎푟푒푖푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푂푢푡푖푡 + 훽2푂푢푡_ℎ푖푔ℎ푖푡 + 훽3푂푓푓푖푡 +
                    + 훽4푂푓푓_ℎ푖푔ℎ푖푡 + 훽5퐻푖푔ℎ푖푡 + 훽6푋푖푡 + 훽7퐴푖푡 +
                    + 훽8퐾푖푡 + 훽9푊푖푡 + 훽10퐶푖푡 + 푇푖푚푒푡 + 퐼푛푑푡 + 휀푖푡  
(5) 
where Out_highit is an interaction term between outsourcing and a dummy, con-
trolling for high-income countries, Off_highit is an interaction term between off-
shoring and a dummy, controlling for high-income countries, and Highit denotes a 
dummy variable, controlling for outsourcing from and offshoring to high-income 
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countries. The rest of the model in the expression (5) follows the basic model (4). 
As aforementioned, the presented literature suggests that outsourcing from high-
income countries and offshoring to low-income countries would increase firms’ skill 
share. The coefficients ß1 and ß2 reflect the impact of the outsourcing from high-
income countries, while the impact of the offshoring to low-income countries is 
reflected in the coefficient ß3. 
Subsequently, the extension of the model also uses different definitions of skills. 
In the previous analyses, workers were usually defined as skilled after achieving a 
particular skill level or by being involved in non-production processes. I believe this 
arrangement is inadequate as formal education is not the only factor which defines 
the skill level of workers. Strictly speaking, besides formal education and training, 
workers acquire skills also through experience and informal training. Therefore, it 
is important to use occupational level when defining skills of workers, in order to 
take into account also the nature of the tasks and duties of workers’ jobs. Four 
different skill levels could be applied to ten major groups of occupations, which are 
classified by the International Labour Organization (ILO). The setting of the pre-
sent paper takes into account a version of the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO), the ISCO-88 classification, which shares the same bounda-
ries of the four skill levels as the ISCO-08 classification. The top two skill levels, 3 
and 4, with the skill level 4 being the highest, relate to tertiary education and 
correspond to three major groups: “Managers” (skill levels 3 and 4), “Professionals” 
(skill level 4) and “Technicians” (skill level 3) (ILO, 2012; and Elias, & Birch, 1994). 
These three major groups of occupations define skilled workers in the extended 
model. “Managers” include legislators, senior officials and managers, whose main 
tasks consist of determining, formulating and supervising the implementation of 
government policies, laws and public regulations, or planning, directing and coor-
dinating the policies and activities of enterprises, organisations, or departments. 
“Professionals” work in the fields of physical, life, or social sciences, or humanities 
and are responsible for increasing the existing stock of knowledge, finding solutions 
to the problems by applying scientific and artistic concepts and theories, and trans-
ferring their knowledge to others. Finally, “Technicians” include technicians and 
associate professionals who have technical knowledge and experience in the fields 
of physical, life, or social sciences, or humanities. Their main tasks include carrying 
out technical work and teaching at particular educational levels, related with the 
abovementioned fields (ILO, 2014). 
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4 Data and descriptive statistics 
By combining different databases, a rich firm-level and employee-level panel dataset 
for Slovenian firms was obtained, covering the period from the year 1997 to 2010. 
The dataset comprises information on the balance sheets data and income state-
ments of Slovenian firms, their export and import activities (i.e. value of exports 
and imports, type of exported and imported goods, and destination of exports and 
imports), characteristics of employees (i.e. gender, age, gross wage, educational level, 
and occupational level), and the information on the foreign direct investments of 
Slovenian firms. The latter gathers information on the FDI flows for a particular 
Slovenian firm. The dataset links the following databases: personal income-tax data, 
transaction-level data on exports and imports of goods, Statistical Registry of Em-
ployees, firm-level accounting data and FDI, and was provided by the Statistical 
office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS), the Tax Authorities of Slovenia (TARS), 
the Bank of Slovenia, and the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal 
Records and Related Services (AJPES). 
After observing vast differences between manufacturing and service firms (Table 
1), and taking into account aforementioned emphasis on the importance of separat-
ing the analysis for manufacturing and service firms (see for example De Backer & 
Yamano, 2012; Michel & Rycx, 2009; and Horgos, 2006), the empirical analysis was 
carried out independently for the two types of firms. Manufacturing firms on aver-
age employ higher number of employees and tertiary educated employees, compared 
to service firms. Furthermore, especially in the more recent years, manufacturing 
firms on average employ slightly older employees than service firms, where age can 
be considered as a proxy for experience of employees (Zoghi, 2010). When compar-
ing the average annual gross wages for the recent years, manufacturing firms on 
average pay their employees lower wages than service firms. However, when com-
paring the average wages of tertiary educated employees, manufacturing firms pay 
higher average wages than service firms. Manufacturing firms on average also have 
lower skill shares than service firms. The latter differences in the average gross 
wages and the skill shares could be the outcome of different occupational and edu-
cational structure of employees in manufacturing and service firms, which will be 
presented in one of the upcoming paragraphs. For brevity, the following tables 
present descriptive statistics for the first half of the treated period with a four-year 
gap, but include all information for the recent years. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Slovenian manufacturing and service firms 
Total 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 18.1 17.3 15.5 15.2 14.2 13.0 12.2 
Employment of ter-
tiary educated 
2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Skill share 21.7 23.2 25.0 25.4 25.9 27.0 28.1 
Age 36.3 38.2 39.3 39.5 39.8 40.2 40.5 
Gross wage 5,139 8,002 10,625 11,311 11,850 11,941 12,260 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
8,696 12,804 16,132 16,993 17,993 17,752 17,703 
Number of firms 25,216 27,064 30,908 32,799 35,833 36,814 37,882 
Manufacturing firms 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 41.4 38.9 35.0 34.4 31.8 27.8 26.6 
Employment of ter-
tiary educated 
3.9 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.3 
Skill share 14.5 14.6 15.9 16.1 16.3 17.2 18.0 
Age 36.2 37.9 39.7 39.9 40.4 40.8 41.2 
Gross wage 5,048 7,658 10,320 11,066 11,664 11,547 11,962 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
9,785 14,154 17,397 18,267 19,232 18,868 18,808 
Number of firms 5,411 5,750 6,140 6,318 6,696 6,746 6,798 
Service firms 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 9.7 9.9 9.6 9.6 9.3 8.9 8.5 
Employment of ter-
tiary educated 
1.4 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Skill share 25.1 27.4 30.1 30.9 31.7 32.9 34.1 
Age 36.3 38.3 39.4 39.6 40.0 40.3 40.6 
Gross wage 5,229 8,257 11,036 11,779 12,426 12,511 12,791 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
8,260 12,363 15,723 16,557 17,565 17,379 17,351 
Number of firms 18,037 19,047 21,527 22,729 24,773 25,647 26,495 
Note. Explanations of the variables are the following: Employment: mean number of employees; Employment 
of tertiary educated: mean number of tertiary educated employees; Skill share: the average of the share of the 
tertiary educated; Age: mean age of employees; Gross wage: mean annual gross wage in €; Gross wage of 
tertiary educated: mean annual gross wage of tertiary educated employees in €; Number of firms: number of 
observations. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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In addition, I also make a comparison between offshoring and outsourcing firms 
(Table 2). Both types of firms are bigger in size, compared to an average firm in 
Table 1. The average age of employees in offshoring and outsourcing firms is also 
slightly higher than in the average firm. Finally, average gross wages and gross 
wages of tertiary educated employees are above the average, where the highest 
average is in the offshoring firms. A separate analysis was done also for firms that 
offshore to and outsource from high-income countries. Descriptive statistics for 
these firms show that they are on average bigger and pay higher wages than average 
offshoring and outsourcing firms. The table is enclosed in the Appendix. 
Table 2. Characteristics of Slovenian firms which offshore and outsource 
Offshoring firms 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 301.9 207.3 194.3 185.6 175.0 163.6 161.3 
Employment of ter-
tiary educated 
35.1 27.9 32.1 32.1 31.9 32.6 34.0 
Skill share 22.5 25.7 31.8 32.9 34.5 35.4 37.6 
Age 38.9 39.1 40.1 40.1 40.4 41.0 41.5 
Gross wage 8,384 11,988 16,934 18,187 19,325 19,453 20,081 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
15,215 19,729 24,759 26,282 27,707 27,380 27,487 
Number of firms 474 831 895 943 994 957 894 
Outsourcing firms 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 49.7 42.1 42.2 38.5 35.4 33.9 32.0 
Employment of ter-
tiary educated 
5.2 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.6 
Skill share 19.8 20.4 22.6 23.0 23.5 24.6 26.8 
Age 36.6 38.2 39.6 39.7 40.2 40.9 41.4 
Gross wage 5,536 8,371 11,011 11,752 12,360 12,603 13,138 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
10,640 15,026 18,366 19,061 19,980 20,027 20,134 
Number of firms 3,520 4,171 2,841 3,089 3,153 2,751 2,495 
Note. Explanations of the variables are the following: Outsourcing firms: firms that import intermediate 
products; Offshoring firms: firms that engage in outward FDI; Employment: mean number of employees; 
Employment of tertiary educated: mean number of tertiary educated employees; Skill share: the average of the 
share of the tertiary educated; Age: mean age of employees; Gross wage: mean annual gross wage in €; Gross 
wage of tertiary educated: mean annual gross wage of tertiary educated employees in €; Number of firms: 
number of observations. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Next, occupational structure of manufacturing and service firms is compared by 
using ISCO-88 classification (Figure 1). In manufacturing firms, the share of Ma-
chinery workers has been decreasing through the period, but it is still the highest 
among all occupational groups. On the other hand, the share of Craft workers has 
been increasing through the period, but stayed the second. The third largest share 
in manufacturing firms belongs to Technicians, while the fourth and fifth largest 
shares appertain to Elementary occupations and Clerks, respectively. In service 
firms, on the other hand, Service workers occupy the largest share and the share 
remains steady throughout the observed period. The second largest share in service 
firms belongs to Technicians, while the third to Clerks. Among other occupational 
groups, Elementary occupations represent the fourth largest share and Machinery 
workers the fifth. Since the shares of Agricultural and Army workers represent only 
a minor part of the total shares in both, manufacturing and service firms, they were 
excluded from further empirical analysis (description of all major occupational 
groups is included in the Appendix). 
Figure 1. Occupational structure of manufacturing and service firms in Slovenia  
 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
Table 3 below presents descriptive statistics of the three major groups of occu-
pations that define skilled workers in the extended model; i.e. Managers, Profes-
sionals, and Technicians. Professionals represent the highest share of tertiary edu-
cated among all groups, followed by Managers and Technicians. This allocation of 
shares is consistent with the ISCO-88 classes of skill levels, presented in the meth-
odological part. Looking at the total average in the observed period, 88.7 % of 
Professionals, 55.1 % of Managers, and 27.4 % of Technicians were tertiary edu-
cated. Taking into account the average age of employees, Managers are on average 
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the oldest among all occupational groups, Professionals were on average a bit older 
than the average worker in the first years of the observational period, while in the 
recent years, they are a bit younger than the average. In contrast, Technicians are 
the youngest of the three groups and compared to the total population of employees. 
Managers earn the highest gross wages among all occupational groups, followed by 
Professionals as the runner-up. Technicians also have above the average wages, 
when looking at the total averages. However, since Professionals and Managers 
present more than a half of all tertiary educated workers and earn the highest wages, 
tertiary educated Technicians earn below the average gross wages, when taking into 
account only tertiary educated workers. 
Descriptive statistics of other occupational groups (included in the Appendix) 
reveal that other groups present only a minor share in the tertiary educated workers. 
The highest share in the total employment on average occupy Machinery workers, 
followed by Craft workers, Elementary workers, Service workers, and Clerical work-
ers, while the highest earners among these groups are on average Clerical workers, 
followed by Machinery workers, Craft workers, Service workers and Elementary 
workers. This distribution of occupations is also the reason for higher average wages 
in manufacturing firms and higher average skill shares in service firms. 
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Table 3. Characteristics of employees in skilled occupations 
Managers 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total 
employment 
5.6 5.5 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.0 
Share in the tertiary 
educated 
25.2 23.4 22.6 21.8 21.7 21.8 21.1 
Age 41.5 43.0 43.7 43.7 43.6 43.9 43.9 
Gross wage 8,972 14,125 18,436 19,530 20,398 20,231 20,301 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
12,859 18,988 24,080 25,517 26,755 26,237 26,092 
Professionals 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total 
employment 
3.9 4.5 5.7 6.0 6.2 7.0 7.8 
Share in the tertiary 
educated 
31.2 31.6 33.9 34.1 34.2 34.6 34.8 
Age 38.4 38.5 38.6 38.7 39.0 39.2 39.4 
Gross wage 9,756 14,707 17,803 18,642 19,792 19,750 19,503 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
10,277 15,411 18,455 19,462 20,732 20,750 20,622 
Technicians 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total 
employment 
15.6 16.2 16.8 16.7 16.5 16.9 16.9 
Share in the tertiary 
educated 
32.2 31.7 30.9 30.7 30.1 29.3 29.1 
Age 35.7 37.5 38.6 38.7 39.1 39.5 39.9 
Gross wage 6,113 9,389 12,166 12,980 13,891 13,970 14,246 
Gross wage of ter-
tiary educated 
8,377 12,484 15,190 16,077 17,127 16,993 17,006 
Note. Explanations of the variables are the following: Share in the total employment: share of a particular 
occupational group in the total employment (in %); Share in the tertiary educated: share of a particular 
occupational group in the total number of tertiary educated employees (in %); Age: mean age of a particular 
occupational group; Gross wage: mean annual gross wage a particular occupational group in €; Gross wage of 
skilled: mean annual gross wage a particular occupational group in €. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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5 Empirical analysis 
As explained in the methodological part, the empirical analysis is split into two 
parts. The basic model measures the effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the 
skill structure of firms. Later, the first extension of the model differentiates between 
outsourcing from high- and low-income countries and offshoring to high- and low-
income countries, while in the second extension, alternative definition of skilled 
employees is introduced, taking into account information on the occupational level 
of employees. 
5.1 Basic model 
Basic model analyses the effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill structure 
in Slovenian firms. First, the models are estimated with the pooled ordinary least 
squares and with methods for panel data analysis; fixed effects and random effects. 
Following Hummels et al. (2014), standard errors are clustered at firm levels. The 
applied procedures follow the methods of Cameron and Trivedi (2009). Due to 
cluster-robust standard errors and an unbalanced panel dataset, a robust version of 
the Hausman test is needed in order to compare fixed and random effects models 
(Cameron, & Trivedi, 2009). In accordance, the method proposed by Schaffer and 
Stillman (2010) is applied, while the Sargan-Hansan test is reported in the tables. 
As introduced in the methodology part, tertiary educated workers are defined as 
skilled in the basic model. For brevity, only the estimates of the variables of interest 
– i.e. outsourcing and offshoring – are presented in the main tables, while the com-
plete results are enclosed in the Appendix. 
Taking into account only the results of the most preferred model, according to 
the Sargan-Hansen test, i.e. the fixed effects, offshoring shows a positive impact on 
the share of skilled workers in manufacturing firms, while the effect of outsourcing 
and offshoring seem to have no impact on the skill structure in service firms (Table 
4). 
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Table 4. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS FE RE 
Offshoring 0.132*** 0.063** 0.094*** 0.325*** 0.035 0.157** 
 [3.10] [2.05] [3.21] [3.55] [0.50] [2.15] 
Outsourcing 0.824 0.212 0.606* 0.212 0.081 0.243 
 [1.03] [0.61] [1.83] [0.34] [0.27] [0.88] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within) 0.074 0.068  0.034 0.023 
R-squared (between) 0.108 0.195  0.042 0.228 
R-squared (overall) 0.229 0.116 0.201 0.236 0.049 0.219 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 354.150*** 691.538*** 
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of 
employees, where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs. 
Control variables used: logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm, logarithm of the total factor productivity 
per employee in a firm, logarithm of the value of exports, logarithm of the average annual gross wage level, 
logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis 
used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
For robustness checks, the models were estimated by adding firm size as one of 
the control variables. In addition, value added was substituted for the total factor 
productivity. In the main tables, total factor productivity is calculated using the 
proposed method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
extend the model of Olley and Pakes (1996) by substituting intermediate inputs, 
instead of investments, when estimating production function. Authors argue one of 
the main benefits of this procedure is data driven as the procedure can be used also 
for firms with zero investments, while another advantage is the result of interme-
diate inputs being more responsive to the total productivity term than investments 
(see for example Levinsohn, & Petrin, 2003; and Petrin, Poi, & Levinsohn, 2004). 
Both measures – the Levinsohn-Petrin measured total factor productivity and the 
value added – have been for example used in Damijan, Konings and Polanec (2014). 
Robustness checks on average confirm results from the basic model on the posi-
tive effect of offshoring on the skill share in manufacturing firms. The robustness 
checks are included in the Appendix.  
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5.2 Extensions of the model 
In order to obtain new information, two extensions of the basic model have been 
made. First extension differentiates between outsourcing from high- and low-income 
countries and offshoring to high- and low-income countries. Second extension in-
cludes information on occupational level of workers when defining skills. Again, the 
following tables include only the estimates of the variables of interest, while the 
estimates of the control variables are enclosed in the Appendix. 
5.2.1 Differentiation between high- and low-income countries 
Differentiating between outsourcing from high- and low-income countries and off-
shoring to high- and low-income countries enables estimation on whether a partic-
ular type of source country of offshoring and outsourcing has a more significant 
impact on the skill structure of domestic firms. 
Adding the interaction terms for high-income countries shows that the effect of 
outsourcing and offshoring on the share of high skilled employees is different for 
different source countries, especially when including also the alternative definition 
of skills, which will be presented in the subsequent subsection. Again, according to 
the Sargan-Hansen statistics, the most preferred results are obtained with the fixed 
effects method, so the following conclusions concentrate on the results of this 
method. For manufacturing firms, offshoring to low-income countries shows a sta-
tistically significant positive impact on the share of skilled employees. Since the 
coefficient on the interaction term between offshoring and high-income countries is 
statistically insignificant, it follows that offshoring to high-income countries does 
not have a stronger impact on the relative employment of skilled employees than 
offshoring to low-income countries. Hence, offshoring to low- and high-income coun-
tries has a similar and positive impact on the share of skilled employees in manu-
facturing firms. Furthermore, while offshoring to low-income countries in service 
firms does not show to have a statistically significant impact on the skill share of 
firms, the negative and statistically significant interaction term indicates that off-
shoring to high-income countries has a weaker impact on the relative employment 
of skilled than offshoring to low-income countries. Outsourcing does not show to 
have an impact on the skill share of firms in neither type of firms. 
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Table 5. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, differentiating between high- and low-income 
countries (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.183*** 0.052* 0.082*** 0.304*** 0.066 0.174** 
 [3.90] [1.67] [2.75] [2.86] [0.91] [2.46] 
Offshoring_high -0.132** 0.038 0.041 0.074 -0.130* -0.067 
 [-2.32] [1.14] [1.21] [0.54] [-1.68] [-0.72] 
Outsourcing -0.347 -0.567 -0.393 -0.602 -0.358 -0.207 
 [-0.18] [-0.58] [-0.43] [-0.36] [-0.64] [-0.31] 
Outsourcing_high 1.340 0.939 1.193 0.972 0.490 0.513 
 [0.58] [0.89] [1.19] [0.52] [0.73] [0.66] 
High 0.090* 0.001 0.017 -0.020 0.007 -0.003 
 [1.84] [0.03] [0.77] [-0.51] [0.29] [-0.15] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.074 0.068  0.034 0.023 
R-squared (between)  0.109 0.196  0.041 0.228 
R-squared (overall) 0.230 0.116 0.201 0.236 0.048 0.219 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 369.865***     703.304 ***   
 
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of 
employees, where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-
income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: 
share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, 
controlling for high-income countries. Control variables used: logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm, 
logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee in a firm, logarithm of the value of exports, logarithm 
of the average annual gross wage level, logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
5.2.2 Alternative definition of skills 
To this point, workers were defined as skilled when reaching tertiary level of edu-
cation. However, since workers gain important skills also through working in firms 
and not only by obtaining formal education, information on occupational level of 
workers is added to the definition of skills, as explained in the methodology part. 
In order to further increase contribution of the analysis, differentiation between 
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high- and low-income countries has been made also in this part of the analysis. As 
in the previous sections, the most preferred method, according to the Sargan-Han-
sen test, is the fixed effects, so the following conclusions relate to the results of this 
method. 
Table 6. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, using occupational classification for defining 
skills (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS FE RE 
Offshoring 0.145*** 0.040 0.058** 0.161** 0.040 0.086* 
 [3.84] [1.57] [2.44] [2.16] [0.79] [1.82] 
Offshoring_high -0.017 0.014 0.013 -0.072 -0.171* -0.139 
 [-0.39] [0.55] [0.54] [-0.53] [-1.68] [-1.13] 
Outsourcing 2.326 0.886 1.035 -1.086 -0.294 -0.190 
 [1.15] [1.09] [1.34] [-0.77] [-0.24] [-0.19] 
Outsourcing_high -1.383 -0.492 -0.516 1.345 -0.263 -0.237 
 [-0.56] [-0.53] [-0.57] [0.84] [-0.20] [-0.21] 
High 0.051 0.001 0.010 0.024 -0.023 -0.018 
 [1.11] [0.06] [0.49] [0.69] [-1.15] [-1.01] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.032 0.026  0.019 0.013 
R-squared (between)  0.022 0.135  0.062 0.204 
R-squared (overall) 0.186 0.031 0.152 0.206 0.057 0.192 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 1,372.538***     397.351***   
 
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of 
employees, where Managers, Professionals, and Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. 
Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in 
the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the 
total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for high-income countries. Control variables used: 
logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm, logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee in a 
firm, logarithm of the value of exports, logarithm of the average annual gross wage level, logarithm of the 
domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-
robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations¸ 
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When defining skilled employees only by their occupational level; i.e. when they 
are classified as Managers, Professionals or Technicians, the results are no more 
statistically significant for manufacturing firms, while the results for service firms 
remain unvaried. 
Next, to further exploit the advantages of taking into account information on 
occupational level, the effect of offshoring and outsourcing on firms’ skill share is 
estimated using disaggregated data for each of the three major skilled occupational 
groups. The following table presents only the results of the most preferred method 
according to the Sargan-Hansen test (that is the fixed effects), while the results of 
all methods are included in the Appendix. 
When defining skills only by the occupational level and disaggregating the data 
by the three major skilled occupational groups (Table 7), results for manufacturing 
firms show a statistically significant impact of offshoring only on the relative em-
ployment of Professionals, while the results in service firms are statistically signifi-
cant only for Technicians. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
the interaction term between offshoring and high-income countries for Professionals 
in manufacturing firms indicates that offshoring to high-income countries has a 
stronger impact on the relative employment of Professionals in manufacturing firms 
than offshoring to low-income countries. Furthermore, while offshoring to low-in-
come countries in service firms does not show to have a statistically significant 
impact on the relative employment of the treating occupations, the negative and 
statistically significant interaction term for Technicians indicates that offshoring to 
high-income countries has a weaker impact on the relative employment of Techni-
cians in service firms, compared to offshoring to low-income countries. 
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Table 7. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian manufacturing and service firms, for the 
major skilled occupational groups (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  Managers Professionals Technicians Managers Professionals Technicians 
Offshoring -0.002 0.046 -0.019 0.056 0.128 -0.046 
 [-0.07] [1.02] [-0.59] [0.59] [1.37] [-0.60] 
Offshoring_high 0.032 0.096** -0.026 -0.062 0.053 -0.258** 
 [0.83] [2.20] [-0.73] [-0.37] [0.39] [-2.51] 
Outsourcing 0.531 -1.030 1.154 0.210 -0.134 0.036 
 [0.83] [-1.11] [1.04] [0.36] [-0.29] [0.03] 
Outsourcing_high -0.560 1.474 -0.785 -0.600 0.264 0.298 
 [-0.61] [1.19] [-0.61] [-0.84] [0.49] [0.24] 
High -0.009 0.025 -0.031 0.008 0.008 -0.021 
 [-0.38] [1.21] [-1.17] [0.34] [0.42] [-0.77] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within) 0.036 0.057 0.036 0.016 0.027 0.035 
R-squared (between) 0.022 0.212 0.149 0.012 0.057 0.062 
R-squared (overall) 0.030 0.202 0.133 0.014 0.070 0.061 
Sargan-Hansen statistics  458.321***  217.669***  542.600*** 122.457*** 367.532*** 307.545*** 
Note. Econometric method: FE: fixed effects. Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated Managers, Professionals, and Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate 
imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, 
controlling for high-income countries. Control variables used: logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm, logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee 
in a firm, logarithm of the value of exports, logarithm of the average annual gross wage level, logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations
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Finally, both definitions for skills are combined, defining workers as skilled if they 
meet both criteria; i.e. if they attain tertiary education and are classified as Man-
agers, Professionals, or Technicians. Results from Table 8 do not show statistically 
significant effects for the most preferred method. When separating the analysis by 
the three major occupational groups (Table 9), the results again confirm that in 
manufacturing firms, offshoring to low-income countries does not show to have a 
statistically significant impact on the relative employment of tertiary educated Pro-
fessionals. However, coefficient on the interaction term points to a stronger impact 
of offshoring to high-income countries on the relative employment of tertiary edu-
cated Professionals, compared to offshoring to low-income countries. In service firms, 
the result is statistically significant only for Managers, where offshoring to low-
income countries has a positive impact on the relative employment of tertiary edu-
cated Managers. Since the coefficient on the interaction term between offshoring 
and high-income countries is statistically insignificant, it follows that offshoring to 
high-income countries does not have a stronger impact on the relative employment 
of tertiary educated Managers, compared to offshoring to low-income countries. 
Offshoring to low- and high-income countries therefore has a similar and positive 
impact on the relative employment of tertiary educated Managers in service firms. 
These results suggest that the effect of educational level is not common, but it 
instead differs between different occupational groups, where the strongest impact 
is on Technicians and Managers in service firms, and Professionals in manufacturing 
firms. While the results for Technicians are no longer statistically significant when 
the skills of employees are defined by both, educational and occupational level, the 
results for Managers indicate that firms have greater incentives for hiring more 
skilled workers. In addition, when taking into account only tertiary educated Pro-
fessionals in manufacturing firms, the coefficient it slightly higher. Therefore, the 
results indicate that firms differentiate between more and less educated individuals 
within the same occupational group, where the positive effects of offshoring are 
concentrated on the tertiary educated Managers in service firms and tertiary edu-
cated Professionals in manufacturing firms. Among the three occupational groups 
that define skills, the majority of Managers and Professionals were on average ter-
tiary educated and the both groups occupied the largest share in the tertiary edu-
cated. Also, with regard to the definitions of the ISCO classification, the two groups 
also perform the most demanding tasks among all occupational groups.
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Table 8. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian manufacturing and service firms, using 
educational level and occupational classification for defining skills (observation period: 1997-2010, only tertiary educated) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  Pooled OLS FE RE Pooled OLS FE RE 
Offshoring 0.215*** 0.048 0.080*** 0.411*** 0.107 0.214*** 
 [4.45] [1.56] [2.76] [3.76] [1.52] [3.08] 
Offshoring_high -0.111* 0.051 0.056* 0.106 -0.015 0.036 
 [-1.89] [1.57] [1.73] [0.78] [-0.15] [0.35] 
Outsourcing -1.452 -0.884 -0.638 -0.218 0.058 0.221 
 [-1.11] [-0.82] [-0.62] [-0.13] [0.15] [0.43] 
Outsourcing_high 2.852* 1.074 1.295 0.376 -0.145 -0.133 
 [1.72] [0.92] [1.15] [0.20] [-0.33] [-0.24] 
High 0.089* 0.010 0.024 -0.001 -0.006 -0.011 
 [1.84] [0.41] [1.05] [-0.03] [-0.28] [-0.53] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.068 0.061  0.036 0.025 
R-squared (between)  0.118 0.209  0.077 0.247 
R-squared (overall) 0.254 0.129 0.222 0.258 0.083 0.239 
Sargan-Hansen statistics  414.314***     709.736***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the 
ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, where Managers, Professionals, and Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. 
Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income 
countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the 
total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for high-income countries. Control variables used: logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm, logarithm of 
the total factor productivity per employee in a firm, logarithm of the value of exports, logarithm of the average annual gross wage level, logarithm of the domestic cost 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table 9. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian manufacturing and service firms, for the 
major skilled occupational groups (observation period: 1997-2010, only tertiary educated) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  Managers Professionals Technicians Managers Professionals Technicians 
Offshoring 0.020 0.028 0.048 0.189** 0.085 0.052 
 [0.54] [0.64] [1.28] [2.19] [1.17] [0.53] 
Offshoring_high 0.055 0.113*** 0.062 -0.168 0.038 0.139 
 [1.34] [2.66] [1.49] [-1.06] [0.31] [1.16] 
Outsourcing 0.032 -1.126 -0.011 -0.313 0.113 0.147 
 [0.05] [-1.38] [-0.02] [-0.76] [0.36] [0.32] 
Outsourcing_high -0.003 1.165 0.121 0.432 -0.133 0.221 
 [-3.30E-03] [1.28] [0.19] [0.95] [-0.40] [0.49] 
High 0.017 0.033* 0.002 1.370E-04 0.001 -0.005 
 [0.81] [1.74] [0.07] [0.01] [0.05] [-0.25] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within) 0.039 0.066 0.056 0.014 0.026 0.025 
R-squared (between) 0.011 0.199 0.139 0.022 0.056 0.047 
R-squared (overall) 0.013 0.196 0.133 0.026 0.067 0.048 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 242.157*** 288.775*** 248.219*** 328.416*** 371.799*** 284.611*** 
Note. Econometric method: FE: fixed effects. Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated Managers, Professionals, and Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate 
imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, 
controlling for high-income countries. Control variables used: logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm, logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee 
in a firm, logarithm of the value of exports, logarithm of the average annual gross wage level, logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations
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6 Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of offshoring and outsourcing on the relative employ-
ment of skilled employees in Slovenian manufacturing and service firms. Using a 
matched firm-level and employee-level dataset for the period from 1997 to 2010, 
the study broadens and contributes to the previous studies in several ways. The 
analysis incorporates both measures; offshoring and outsourcing, in one model, and 
differentiates between outsourcing from high- and low-income countries, and off-
shoring to high- and low-income countries. Furthermore, different definitions of 
skills are applied in order to increase the explanatory value of the model. The basic 
model uses a conventional definition of skills, defining workers as skilled when they 
attain tertiary education. However, since workers develop additional knowledge and 
expertise after entering employment, taking into account solely the level of formal 
education when defining skills ignores the knowledge acquired during the course of 
employment. Consequently, occupational classification is used to define skills in the 
model extensions, where three major occupational groups define workers as skilled; 
Managers, Professionals and Technicians. 
The main findings of the analysis are the following. First, offshoring has a 
stronger effect on the relative employment of skilled workers than outsourcing. Sec-
ond, when controlling for high- and low-income countries, offshoring to low- and 
high-income countries has a similar and positive effect on the relative share of 
skilled employees in manufacturing firms. In service firms, offshoring to low-income 
countries does not have a statistically significant impact on the skill share of firms, 
while offshoring to high-income countries shows a weaker impact on the skill share 
than offshoring to low-income countries. These results partially confirm the hypoth-
esis made on the expected positive effect of offshoring to low-income countries, 
while the hypothesis for the expected positive effect of outsourcing from high-in-
come countries cannot be confirmed. Finally, taking into account occupational level 
when defining skills increases the explanatory power of the model and serves as an 
additional robustness check. In manufacturing firms, the results do not vary signif-
icantly when defining skilled only by the occupational level or when defining skilled 
by both, occupational and educational level. Results point to a stronger impact of 
offshoring to high-income countries on the relative employment of Professionals in 
manufacturing firms than offshoring to low-income countries. In addition, when 
taking into account only tertiary educated Professionals, compared to all Profes-
sionals in manufacturing firms, the coefficient on the interaction term slightly in-
creases. On the other hand, results for service firms vary depending on the definition 
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of skilled. When defining skilled only by the occupational level, results point to a 
weaker impact of offshoring to high-income countries on the relative employment 
of Technicians, compared to offshoring to low-income countries. When defining 
skilled by using both definitions, results confirm a positive and similar impact of 
offshoring to high- and low-income countries on the relative employment of tertiary 
educated Managers. The impact of education therefore differs between occupational 
groups and is mostly concentrated on the tertiary educated Managers in service 
firms and tertiary educated Professionals in manufacturing firms, indicating that 
firms differentiate between more and less educated individuals within the same 
occupational group. This finding indicates that firms have greater incentives for 
hiring skilled workers. 
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Appendix A:  Derivation of the model 
First, consider the following production function for firm i in year t: 
 푌푖푡 = 퐴푖푡퐾푖푡
훼퐻푖푡
훽퐶푖푡
1−훼−훽 (A1) 
As already mentioned, the dependent variable, Yit, is the output,  Ait is productivity, 
Kit is the capital, Hit is skilled labour, and Cit is a composite input, consisting of domestic 
and foreign inputs (Cit=Dit+Fit), where the latter relate to outsourcing and/or offshoring 
activities, whereas the former relate to domestic costs and unskilled labour. 
As in Hummels et al. (2014), I introduce Pit as a reduced-form of the demand for firm 
i’s products and derive the demand for skilled labour of firm i in year t, by making 
derivatives of the equation (A1): 
 푃푖푡
휕푌푖푡
휕퐻푖푡
= 푃푖푡퐴푖푡퐾푖푡
훼훽퐻푖푡
훽−1퐶푖푡
1−훼−훽 (A2) 
First, foreign inputs of firms, Fit, are separated into outsourcing (Outit) and offshoring 
(Offit) activities (Fit=Outit+Offit), and domestic inputs of firms, Dit, are separated into 
unskilled labour (Lit) and domestic costs (Cit); (Dit=Lit+Cit). Next, I take logarithms of 
the equation (A2) and get the following: 
 
ln 푃푖푡 + ln 퐴푖푡 + 훼 ln 퐾푖푡 +β(훽 − 1)ln퐻푖푡 +
+ (1 − 훼 − 훽)ln(푂푢푡푖푡 + 푂푓푓푖푡 + 퐿푖푡 + 퐶푖푡) = 0 
(A3) 
To implement equation (A3) in the data, the equation is first rearranged so that the 
variable of interest is skill structure of firms: 
 
−β(훽 − 1) ln 퐻푖푡 = ln 푃푖푡 + ln 퐴푖푡 + 훼 ln 퐾푖푡 + 
+ (1 − 훼 − 훽)ln(푂푢푡푖푡 + 푂푓푓푖푡 + 퐿푖푡 + 퐶푖푡) 
(A4) 
Next, the variables are scaled with the total number of employees in a firm. However, 
as already explained, following Hummels et al. (2014) I do not scale outsourcing, exports 
and levels of domestic costs by firm size in order to enhance explanatory value of the 
model. Furthermore, as in Hummels et al. (2014), logarithm of the value of exports (Xit) 
is introduced to capture time varying shocks to demand of firms’ output (Pit), and the 
logarithm of the average wage level in the firm i and year t (Wit). 
Observed model is therefore the following: 
 
푆푘푖푙푙_푠ℎ푎푟푒푖푡 = 훽0+훽1푂푢푡푖푡+훽2푂푓푓푖푡 + 훽3푋푖푡 + 훽4퐴푖푡 + 훽5퐾푖푡 +
                    + 훽6푊푖푡+훽7퐶푖푡 + 푇푖푚푒푡 + 퐼푛푑푡 + 휀푖푡  
(A5) 
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Appendix B:  Description of ISCO-88 major occupational groups 
ISCO-88 classification arranges occupations in ten major groups. The first major group 
are “Managers”, which include legislators, senior officials and managers, whose main 
tasks consist of determining, formulating and supervising the implementation of govern-
ment policies, laws and public regulations, or planning, directing and coordinating the 
policies and activities of enterprises, organisations, or departments. Next major group 
are “Professionals”, who work in the fields of physical, life, or social sciences, or human-
ities. They are responsible for increasing the existing stock of knowledge, finding solutions 
to the problems by applying scientific and artistic concepts and theories, and transferring 
their knowledge to others. Another major group, “Technicians”, include technicians and 
associate professionals who have technical knowledge and experience in the fields of phys-
ical, life, or social sciences, or humanities. Their main tasks include carrying out technical 
work and teaching at particular educational levels, related with the abovementioned 
fields. Furthermore, the group “Clerks” define occupations, which possess the knowledge 
and skills of organising, storing, computing and retrieving information. Their main tasks 
are performing secretarial duties, operating different office machines, recording and com-
puting numerical data, and performing various customer-oriented clerical duties. The 
group “Service workers” include service, shop, and market sales workers, whose main 
tasks consist of providing personal and protective services, and to sell goods in shops or 
at markets. In addition, a group “Agricultural workers” consist of skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers, who produce farm, forestry and fishery products, and sell them to pur-
chasers, marketing organisations or at markets. Next, the group “Craft workers” include 
craft and other related trade workers whose main tasks include extracting raw materials, 
constructing buildings and other structures, and making various products and handicraft 
goods. Moreover, a group “Machine operators” include plant and machine operators and 
assemblers, who operate and monitor large scale, and often highly automated, industrial 
machinery and equipment. “Elementary occupations” combine occupations whose main 
tasks in general include simple and routine tasks, by using the hand-held tools and in 
some cases considerable amount of physical effort. Finally, the group “Armed forces” 
include individuals, who are serving in the armed forces on a voluntary or compulsory 
basis and are also restricted to accept civilian employment (ILO, 2014). 
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Appendix C:  Tables 
Table C1. Characteristics of Slovenian firms which offshore to and outsource from 
high-income countries 
Firms, offshoring to high-income countries 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 509.4 421.3 407.8 309.1 214.2 200.4 199.3 
Employment of tertiary educated 56.3 55.0 63.5 59.1 39.6 40.1 42.1 
Skill share 23.83 25.49 31.46 32.6 34.69 35.85 37.5 
Age 39.5 39.5 40.1 40.1 40.6 41.2 41.7 
Gross wage 8,930 12,782 17,741 20,128 19,547 19,894 20,481 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 15,835 21,712 26,789 29,254 27,963 27,881 28,004 
Firms, outsourcing from high-income countries 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 52.1 43.7 44.6 41.1 37.1 35.5 34.3 
Employment of tertiary educated 5.5 5.4 6.3 5.9 5.4 5.8 6.0 
Skill share 19.48 20.41 22.17 22.53 23.51 25.03 26.2 
Age 36.6 38.2 39.6 39.8 40.2 41.0 41.5 
Gross wage 5,552 8,430 11,112 11,816 12,425 12,792 13,305 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 10,730 15,251 18,644 19,342 20,073 20,294 20,569 
Note. Explanations of the variables are the following: Outsourcing firms: firms that import intermediate products; 
Offshoring firms: firms that engage in outward FDI; Employment: mean number of employees; Employment of tertiary 
educated: mean number of tertiary educated employees; Skill share: the average of the share of the tertiary educated; 
Age: mean age of employees; Gross wage: mean annual gross wage in €; Gross wage of tertiary educated: mean annual 
gross wage of tertiary educated employees in €. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Table C2. Characteristics of employees in unskilled occupations 
Clerical workers 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total employment 12.0 10.5 9.7 9.5 9.3 9.5 9.4 
Share in the tertiary educated 4.5 4.7 5.9 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.8 
Age 35.0 37.1 38.7 38.8 39.3 39.7 39.9 
Gross wage 5,203 8,126 10,451 11,064 11,622 11,730 12,044 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 7,357 11,217 12,981 13,593 14,419 14,482 14,626 
Service workers 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total employment 11.1 11.3 11.2 11.4 11.5 12.1 12.3 
Share in the tertiary educated 1.3 1.6 2.3 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.6 
Age 33.0 35.0 36.4 36.7 37.2 37.6 38.0 
Gross wage 4,225 6,369 8,286 8,862 9,365 9,458 9,859 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 6,698 9,654 11,006 11,411 12,295 12,286 12,766 
Craft workers 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total employment 15.8 16.8 17.8 18.0 18.2 17.9 17.4 
Share in the tertiary educated 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Age 35.0 36.6 38.2 38.3 38.6 39.1 39.6 
Gross wage 4,553 6,827 9,054 9,615 10,218 10,244 10,631 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 6,689 10,606 13,804 14,393 15,984 15,680 15,744 
Machinery workers 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total employment 27.8 23.1 19.0 18.2 17.5 15.8 15.5 
Share in the tertiary educated 4.9 5.9 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.0 
Age 35.3 37.4 39.4 39.7 40.1 40.6 41.2 
Gross wage 4,582 7,120 9,468 10,154 10,601 10,529 11,241 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 6,210 8,512 12,522 13,744 14,427 14,645 16,352 
Elementary workers 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share in the total employment 7.2 11.2 13.1 13.5 13.8 13.4 13.1 
Share in the tertiary educated 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Age 35.8 36.5 37.9 38.1 38.5 39.2 40.0 
Gross wage 3,664 5,400 7,031 7,483 7,700 7,815 8,385 
Gross wage of tertiary educated 4,942 6,463 8,340 8,702 9,619 9,334 9,571 
Note. Explanations of the variables are the following: Share in the total employment: share of a particular occupational 
group in the total employment (in %); Share in the tertiary educated: share of a particular occupational group in the 
total number of tertiary educated employees (in %); Age: mean age of a particular occupational group; Gross wage: 
mean gross annual wage a particular occupational group in €; Gross wage of tertiary educated: mean gross annual 
wage of tertiary educated employees in €. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Table C3. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.132*** 0.063** 0.094*** 0.325*** 0.035 0.157** 
 [3.10] [2.05] [3.21] [3.55] [0.50] [2.15] 
Outsourcing 0.824 0.212 0.606* 0.212 0.081 0.243 
 [1.03] [0.61] [1.83] [0.34] [0.27] [0.88] 
log(capital per emp) 0.026* 0.020 0.027** 0.021* -0.008 0.003 
 [1.68] [1.61] [2.43] [1.80] [-0.85] [0.45] 
log(tfp) -0.002 -0.018 -0.023 0.040** -0.083*** -0.049*** 
 [-0.13] [-1.07] [-1.54] [2.41] [-6.00] [-4.12] 
log(export value) 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
 [1.21] [0.40] [1.10] [-0.66] [0.93] [0.34] 
log(gross wage) 0.545*** 0.199*** 0.247*** 0.605*** 0.150*** 0.256*** 
 [9.42] [5.20] [6.40] [15.7] [5.99] [9.82] 
log(domestic costs) 0.161*** 0.049** 0.104*** 0.124*** 0.065*** 0.085*** 
 [9.02] [2.31] [6.96] [9.26] [3.98] [7.75] 
Constant -5.224*** -0.606 -2.621*** -6.307*** -0.905 -2.194*** 
 [-5.10] [-0.97] [-5.70] [-15.2] [-1.32] [-6.53] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within) 0.074 0.068  0.034 0.023 
R-squared (between) 0.108 0.195  0.042 0.228 
R-squared (overall) 0.229 0.116 0.201 0.236 0.049 0.219 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 354.150***      691.538***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; log(capital per 
emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee 
in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average annual gross 
wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics 
in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Table C4. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, robustness checks: include firm size as explanatory 
variable (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.133*** 0.064** 0.092*** 0.256*** 0.028 0.120 
 [3.11] [2.06] [3.10] [2.75] [0.40] [1.62] 
Outsourcing 0.831 0.164 0.491 0.023 -0.085 0.022 
 [1.04] [0.47] [1.48] [0.037] [-0.28] [0.078] 
log(capital per emp) 0.025 0.024* 0.033*** 0.027** 0.007 0.016** 
 [1.57] [1.81] [2.89] [2.32] [0.82] [2.05] 
log(tfp) -0.005 -0.002 0.008 0.142*** -0.001 0.040*** 
 [-0.17] [-0.12] [0.46] [5.77] [-0.073] [2.93] 
log(export value) 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
 [1.21] [0.38] [0.99] [-0.71] [0.94] [0.39] 
log(gross wage) 0.545*** 0.195*** 0.239*** 0.557*** 0.119*** 0.222*** 
 [9.29] [5.05] [6.18] [14.4] [4.86] [8.73] 
log(domestic costs) 0.162*** 0.036 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.003 0.016 
 [6.36] [1.52] [3.96] [3.64] [0.19] [1.22] 
log(employment) -0.004 0.035 0.062** 0.171*** 0.232*** 0.222*** 
 [-0.098] [0.97] [2.15] [5.01] [6.73] [8.67] 
Constant -5.235*** -0.538 -2.476*** -5.900*** -0.488 -1.628*** 
 [-5.05] [-0.85] [-5.14] [-13.8] [-0.73] [-4.73] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,951 18,951 18,951 29,599 29,599 29,599 
R-squared (within) 0.074 0.068  0.040 0.028 
R-squared (between) 0.112 0.194  0.048 0.224 
R-squared (overall) 0.074 0.120 0.200 0.040 0.055 0.216 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 357.793***     665.504***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; log(capital per 
emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee 
in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average annual gross 
wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level; log(employment): logarithm of the number of 
employees. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Table C5. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms; robustness checks: exchange total factor productivity 
for value added (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.135*** 0.064** 0.097*** 0.308*** 0.030 0.162** 
 [3.14] [2.06] [3.31] [3.39] [0.42] [2.19] 
Outsourcing 0.818 0.216 0.617* 0.166 0.108 0.275 
 [1.03] [0.62] [1.89] [0.27] [0.36] [0.98] 
log(capital per emp) 0.023 0.019 0.025** 0.006 -0.006 0.001 
 [1.51] [1.55] [2.27] [0.50] [-0.64] [0.17] 
log(value added per emp) 0.014 -0.009 -0.005 0.125*** -0.041*** 0.003 
 [0.46] [-0.50] [-0.29] [5.35] [-2.78] [0.23] 
log(export value) 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
 [1.28] [0.41] [1.19] [-0.68] [0.89] [0.29] 
log(gross wage) 0.538*** 0.199*** 0.245*** 0.566*** 0.148*** 0.248*** 
 [9.19] [5.20] [6.36] [14.6] [5.90] [9.51] 
log(domestic costs) 0.161*** 0.054** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.076*** 0.090*** 
 [11.3] [2.45] [7.51] [8.04] [4.53] [7.99] 
Constant -5.282*** -0.721 -2.878*** -6.281*** -1.332* -2.591*** 
 [-5.27] [-1.16] [-6.83] [-16.1] [-1.91] [-7.93] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,951 18,951 18,951 29,599 29,599 29,599 
R-squared (within)  0.075 0.069  0.031 0.020 
R-squared (between)  0.101 0.193  0.048 0.233 
R-squared (overall) 0.230 0.109 0.199 0.237 0.053 0.223 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 419.160***   703.551*** 
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; log(capital per 
emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(value added per emp): logarithm of the value added per 
employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average 
annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Table C6. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, robustness checks: include firm size as explanatory 
variable; robustness checks: exchange total factor productivity for value added (obser-
vation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.133*** 0.064** 0.093*** 0.253*** 0.028 0.120 
 [3.12] [2.06] [3.13] [2.72] [0.39] [1.62] 
Outsourcing 0.798 0.152 0.473 0.023 -0.089 0.020 
 [0.99] [0.44] [1.43] [0.04] [-0.29] [0.07] 
log(capital per emp) 0.024 0.024* 0.031*** 0.007 0.007 0.010 
 [1.50] [1.84] [2.76] [0.62] [0.79] [1.29] 
log(value added per emp) 0.017 0.001 0.012 0.146*** 0.004 0.043*** 
 [0.54] [0.07] [0.72] [5.94] [0.26] [3.18] 
log(export value) 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
 [1.25] [0.40] [1.02] [-0.71] [0.94] [0.39] 
log(gross wage) 0.537*** 0.195*** 0.238*** 0.555*** 0.118*** 0.221*** 
 [9.16] [5.05] [6.17] [14.3] [4.82] [8.70] 
log(domestic costs) 0.157*** 0.034 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.002 0.015 
 [6.14] [1.45] [3.83] [3.62] [0.11] [1.16] 
log(employment) 0.006 0.038 0.057** 0.065*** 0.235*** 0.193*** 
 [0.20] [1.20] [2.38] [2.69] [7.68] [8.85] 
Constant -5.235*** -0.534 -2.466*** -5.886*** -0.498 -1.646*** 
 [-5.05] [-0.85] [-5.14] [-13.9] [-0.74] [-4.79] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,951 18,951 18,951 29,599 29,599 29,599 
R-squared (within)  0.076 0.070  0.040 0.028 
R-squared (between)  0.107 0.192  0.049 0.225 
R-squared (overall) 0.230 0.115 0.199 0.238 0.056 0.216 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 427.403***   663.622*** 
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; log(capital per 
emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(value added per emp): logarithm of the value added per 
employee; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average annual gross 
wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level; log(employment): logarithm of the number of 
employees. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
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Table C7. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, differentiating between high- and low-income coun-
tries (observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.183*** 0.052* 0.082*** 0.304*** 0.066 0.174** 
 [3.90] [1.67] [2.75] [2.86] [0.91] [2.46] 
Offshoring_high -0.132** 0.038 0.041 0.074 -0.130* -0.067 
 [-2.32] [1.14] [1.21] [0.54] [-1.68] [-0.72] 
Outsourcing -0.347 -0.567 -0.393 -0.602 -0.358 -0.207 
 [-0.18] [-0.58] [-0.43] [-0.36] [-0.64] [-0.31] 
Outsourcing_high 1.340 0.939 1.193 0.972 0.49 0.513 
 [0.58] [0.89] [1.19] [0.52] [0.73] [0.66] 
High 0.090* 0.001 0.017 -0.020 0.007 -0.003 
 [1.84] [0.034] [0.77] [-0.51] [0.29] [-0.15] 
log(capital per emp) 0.026* 0.020 0.027** 0.021* -0.008 0.003 
 [1.69] [1.61] [2.43] [1.79] [-0.85] [0.45] 
log(tfp) -0.002 -0.018 -0.023 0.040** -0.083*** -0.049*** 
 [-0.088] [-1.08] [-1.54] [2.41] [-6.00] [-4.12] 
log(export value) 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
 [1.07] [0.42] [1.15] [-0.71] [0.94] [0.31] 
log(gross wage) 0.540*** 0.200*** 0.247*** 0.604*** 0.149*** 0.256*** 
 [9.38] [5.21] [6.40] [15.7] [5.99] [9.82] 
log(domestic costs) 0.161*** 0.049** 0.104*** 0.124*** 0.064*** 0.085*** 
 [9.01] [2.33] [6.94] [9.26] [3.97] [7.75] 
Constant -5.305*** -0.608 -2.638*** -6.289*** -0.901 -2.190*** 
 [-5.17] [-0.98] [-5.74] [-15.1] [-1.31] [-6.50] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.074 0.068  0.034 0.023 
R-squared (between)  0.109 0.196  0.041 0.228 
R-squared (overall) 0.230 0.116 0.201 0.236 0.048 0.219 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 369.865***     703.304 ***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated workers are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income countries; 
Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports 
from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for high-income countries; 
log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the total factor productivity 
per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average 
annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C8. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, using occupational classification for defining skills 
(observation period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.145*** 0.040 0.058** 0.161** 0.040 0.086* 
 [3.84] [1.57] [2.44] [2.16] [0.79] [1.82] 
Offshoring_high -0.017 0.014 0.013 -0.072 -0.171* -0.139 
 [-0.39] [0.55] [0.54] [-0.53] [-1.68] [-1.13] 
Outsourcing 2.326 0.886 1.035 -1.086 -0.294 -0.190 
 [1.15] [1.09] [1.34] [-0.77] [-0.24] [-0.19] 
Outsourcing_high -1.383 -0.492 -0.516 1.345 -0.263 -0.237 
 [-0.56] [-0.53] [-0.57] [0.84] [-0.20] [-0.21] 
High 0.051 0.001 0.010 0.024 -0.023 -0.018 
 [1.11] [0.056] [0.49] [0.69] [-1.15] [-1.01] 
log(capital per emp) 2.970E-04 -0.004 3.570E-04 0.011 -0.008 -0.004 
 [0.022] [-0.37] [0.038] [1.02] [-0.94] [-0.58] 
log(tfp) 0.110*** 0.021 0.032** 0.147*** -0.015 0.026** 
 [6.26] [1.19] [2.10] [10.0] [-1.05] [2.16] 
log(export value) -0.006** -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 [-2.26] [-0.48] [-0.93] [0.81] [0.92] [1.11] 
log(gross wage) 0.413*** 0.208*** 0.240*** 0.374*** 0.173*** 0.230*** 
 [7.39] [5.52] [6.45] [12.8] [7.29] [9.95] 
log(domestic costs) 0.065*** -0.007 0.019 0.033*** 0.013 0.010 
 [3.98] [-0.35] [1.29] [2.83] [0.81] [0.93] 
Constant -2.433*** 1.292** -0.095 -1.902*** 1.914*** 0.378 
 [-3.86] [2.34] [-0.17] [-5.30] [4.69] [1.15] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.032 0.026  0.019 0.013 
R-squared (between)  0.022 0.135  0.062 0.204 
R-squared (overall) 0.186 0.031 0.152 0.206 0.057 0.192 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 1,372.538***     397.351  ***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where Managers, Professionals, and Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of 
variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for 
outward FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; 
Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy 
variable, controlling for high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; 
log(tfp): logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of 
exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the 
domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust 
standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C9. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, for the occupational group “Managers” (observation 
period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.170*** -0.002 0.007 0.179 0.056 0.043 
 [3.40] [-0.07] [0.22] [1.60] [0.59] [0.50] 
Offshoring_high 0.068 0.032 0.027 -0.121 -0.062 -0.089 
 [1.31] [0.83] [0.72] [-0.67] [-0.37] [-0.55] 
Outsourcing 4.070* 0.531 0.578 -1.904 0.210 -0.118 
 [1.75] [0.83] [0.91] [-1.06] [0.36] [-0.21] 
Outsourcing_high -3.510 -0.560 -0.746 2.035 -0.6 -0.307 
 [-1.24] [-0.61] [-0.82] [1.04] [-0.84] [-0.45] 
High 0.085 -0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.008 0.013 
 [1.64] [-0.38] [-0.063] [0.11] [0.34] [0.58] 
log(capital per emp) 0.013 0.024** 0.021* -0.011 0.019* 0.011 
 [0.88] [1.97] [1.90] [-0.87] [1.89] [1.31] 
log(tfp) 0.141*** 0.026 0.045*** 0.134*** 0.007 0.030** 
 [6.98] [1.47] [2.82] [7.78] [0.48] [2.39] 
log(export value) -0.004 0.001 -3.500E-04 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-1.15] [0.25] [-0.17] [0.83] [-0.47] [-0.43] 
log(gross wage) 0.359*** 0.252*** 0.266*** 0.296*** 0.172*** 0.192*** 
 [6.79] [5.88] [6.53] [8.98] [6.92] [8.35] 
log(domestic costs) -0.085*** -0.055*** -0.068*** -0.030** -0.002 -0.027** 
 [-4.70] [-2.68] [-4.44] [-2.10] [-0.13] [-2.13] 
Constant -0.331 0.533 -0.554 -0.71 0.385 -0.019 
 [-0.47] [0.90] [-0.95] [-1.40] [0.91] [-0.048] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.036 0.033  0.016 0.013 
R-squared (between)  0.022 0.067  0.012 0.038 
R-squared (overall) 0.113 0.030 0.083 0.052 0.014 0.040 
Sargan-Hansen statistics  458.321***     122.457***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where Managers in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income countries; 
Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports 
from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for high-income countries; 
log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the total factor productivity 
per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average 
annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C10. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, for the occupational group “Professionals” (observa-
tion period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.235*** 0.046 0.100** 0.327*** 0.128 0.249*** 
 [4.00] [1.02] [2.47] [3.18] [1.37] [2.97] 
Offshoring_high 0.041 0.096** 0.113*** 0.421*** 0.053 0.114 
 [0.57] [2.20] [2.68] [2.79] [0.39] [0.88] 
Outsourcing -0.521 -1.030 -0.744 0.456 -0.134 0.048 
 [-0.76] [-1.11] [-0.87] [0.36] [-0.29] [0.11] 
Outsourcing_high 1.034 1.474 1.583 0.176 0.264 0.233 
 [1.07] [1.19] [1.30] [0.11] [0.49] [0.44] 
High 0.027 0.025 0.035* 0.050* 0.008 0.018 
 [0.87] [1.21] [1.85] [1.82] [0.42] [1.02] 
log(capital per emp) -0.019* 0.009 0.008 0.020*** -0.004 0.006 
 [-1.87] [0.89] [0.96] [2.63] [-0.48] [1.10] 
log(tfp) -0.057*** -0.044*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.061*** 
 [-4.38] [-3.31] [-5.19] [-5.24] [-6.68] [-7.03] 
log(export value) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 [0.30] [0.36] [1.18] [0.38] [1.43] [1.21] 
log(gross wage) 0.336*** 0.055** 0.110*** 0.349*** 0.074*** 0.146*** 
 [8.84] [2.41] [5.16] [14.7] [4.46] [9.51] 
log(domestic costs) 0.160*** 0.073*** 0.125*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
 [14.0] [3.56] [10.8] [7.36] [4.89] [8.45] 
Constant -4.416*** -1.177** -1.786*** -3.382*** -1.679*** -1.637*** 
 [-8.39] [-2.28] [-2.70] [-12.6] [-3.15] [-7.94] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.057 0.051  0.027 0.020 
R-squared (between)  0.212 0.313  0.057 0.190 
R-squared (overall) 0.313 0.202 0.294 0.208 0.070 0.196 
Sargan-Hansen statistics  217.669***     367.532***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where Professionals in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income 
countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of 
intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for 
high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the 
total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): 
logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C11. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, for the occupational group “Technicians” (observation 
period: 1997-2010) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring -0.054 -0.019 -0.006 0.031 -0.046 0.047 
 [-1.07] [-0.59] [-0.21] [0.25] [-0.60] [0.66] 
Offshoring_high -0.234*** -0.026 -0.033 -0.199 -0.258** -0.168* 
 [-3.93] [-0.73] [-0.95] [-1.11] [-2.51] [-1.82] 
Outsourcing -1.239 1.154 1.225 3.336** 0.036 0.860 
 [-0.82] [1.04] [1.09] [2.17] [0.029] [0.74] 
Outsourcing_high 2.101 -0.785 -0.436 -3.421** 0.298 -0.342 
 [1.25] [-0.61] [-0.34] [-2.08] [0.24] [-0.29] 
High -0.002 -0.031 -0.018 -0.006 -0.021 -0.036 
 [-0.041] [-1.17] [-0.72] [-0.14] [-0.77] [-1.46] 
log(capital per emp) 1.370E-04 -0.016 -0.006 0.011 -0.035*** -0.021** 
 [0.01] [-1.14] [-0.52] [0.94] [-3.28] [-2.38] 
log(tfp) -0.059*** -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.125*** -0.141*** -0.139*** 
 [-3.03] [-3.86] [-4.79] [-7.58] [-8.59] [-10.5] 
log(export value) -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [-0.71] [0.49] [0.36] [-0.15] [0.27] [0.32] 
log(gross wage) 0.284*** 0.065* 0.104*** 0.175*** 0.013 0.064*** 
 [5.69] [1.71] [2.98] [5.98] [0.55] [3.19] 
log(domestic costs) 0.233*** 0.117*** 0.179*** 0.248*** 0.136*** 0.198*** 
 [14.4] [5.04] [11.8] [19.1] [6.92] [16.5] 
Constant -5.389*** -0.737 -2.071*** -4.510*** 0.24 -1.670*** 
 [-11.4] [-1.04] [-2.85] [-11.2] [0.45] [-5.32] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.036 0.031  0.035 0.028 
R-squared (between)  0.149 0.237  0.062 0.164 
R-squared (overall) 0.249 0.133 0.225 0.175 0.061 0.165 
Sargan-Hansen statistics  542.600***     307.545***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy 
variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-income 
countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of 
intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for 
high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the 
total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): 
logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C12. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, using educational level and occupational classification 
for defining skills (observation period: 1997-2010, only tertiary educated) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.215*** 0.048 0.080*** 0.411*** 0.107 0.214*** 
 [4.45] [1.56] [2.76] [3.76] [1.52] [3.08] 
Offshoring_high -0.111* 0.051 0.056* 0.106 -0.015 0.036 
 [-1.89] [1.57] [1.73] [0.78] [-0.15] [0.35] 
Outsourcing -1.452 -0.884 -0.638 -0.218 0.058 0.221 
 [-1.11] [-0.82] [-0.62] [-0.13] [0.15] [0.43] 
Outsourcing_high 2.852* 1.074 1.295 0.376 -0.145 -0.133 
 [1.72] [0.92] [1.15] [0.20] [-0.33] [-0.24] 
High 0.089* 0.010 0.024 -0.001 -0.006 -0.011 
 [1.84] [0.41] [1.05] [-0.029] [-0.28] [-0.53] 
log(capital per emp) 0.015 0.024** 0.0280*** 0.029*** -0.007 0.006 
 [1.00] [1.99] [2.61] [2.59] [-0.76] [0.79] 
log(tfp) -0.016 -0.028* -0.034** 0.071*** -0.064*** -0.031*** 
 [-0.81] [-1.68] [-2.33] [4.26] [-4.81] [-2.66] 
log(export value) 0.003 0.001 0.003 -5.360E-05 0.002 0.001 
 [0.83] [0.66] [1.33] [-0.014] [0.94] [0.48] 
log(gross wage) 0.573*** 0.213*** 0.260*** 0.637*** 0.182*** 0.281*** 
 [10.6] [6.49] [7.77] [16.5] [7.67] [11.3] 
log(domestic costs) 0.161*** 0.032 0.089*** 0.116*** 0.059*** 0.075*** 
 [9.22] [1.62] [6.20] [8.85] [3.87] [7.15] 
Constant -6.237*** -0.509 -2.577*** -6.993*** -1.401** -2.578*** 
 [-9.73] [-0.88] [-5.92] [-17.5] [-2.04] [-7.95] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.068 0.061  0.0357 0.025 
R-squared (between)  0.118 0.209  0.0769 0.247 
R-squared (overall) 0.254 0.129 0.222 0.258 0.083 0.239 
Sargan-Hansen statistics  414.314***     709.736***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated Managers, Professionals, and Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. 
Explanation of variables: Offshoring: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, 
controlling for outward FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material 
costs; Outsourcing_high: share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: 
dummy variable, controlling for high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in 
a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the 
value of exports; log(gross wage): logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of 
the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust 
standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C13. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, for the occupational group “Managers” (observation 
period: 1997-2010, only tertiary educated) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.178*** 0.020 0.044 0.421*** 0.189** 0.226*** 
 [3.59] [0.54] [1.22] [3.58] [2.19] [2.80] 
Offshoring_high -0.016 0.055 0.058 -0.064 -0.168 -0.158 
 [-0.26] [1.34] [1.41] [-0.35] [-1.06] [-1.03] 
Outsourcing -0.349 0.032 0.212 -0.588 -0.313 -0.187 
 [-0.24] [0.053] [0.35] [-0.34] [-0.76] [-0.42] 
Outsourcing_high 1.641 -0.003 0.096 0.627 0.432 0.311 
 [0.91] [-3.30E-03] [0.12] [0.35] [0.95] [0.63] 
High 0.064 0.017 0.027 -0.047 1.370E-04 -0.009 
 [1.52] [0.81] [1.34] [-1.29] [0.01] [-0.51] 
log(capital per emp) 0.020 0.021* 0.023** 0.021** 0.006 0.011* 
 [1.46] [1.93] [2.39] [2.01] [0.83] [1.65] 
log(tfp) 0.007 0.017 0.012 0.084*** -0.010 0.007 
 [0.39] [0.99] [0.78] [5.57] [-0.88] [0.75] 
log(export value) 0.003 0.004* 0.004** 0.002 4.710E-04 2.390E-04 
 [1.14] [1.95] [2.39] [0.52] [0.25] [0.14] 
log(gross wage) 0.406*** 0.172*** 0.202*** 0.375*** 0.095*** 0.147*** 
 [8.90] [5.44] [6.44] [11.8] [5.14] [7.98] 
log(domestic costs) 0.021 -0.025 0.003 0.043*** 0.030** 0.028*** 
 [1.32] [-1.37] [0.26] [3.45] [2.13] [2.89] 
Constant -3.110*** 0.175 -1.883*** -3.811*** -1.193* -1.307*** 
 [-5.34] [0.31] [-3.97] [-10.5] [-1.93] [-4.62] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.039 0.034  0.014 0.009 
R-squared (between)  0.011 0.062  0.022 0.106 
R-squared (overall) 0.101 0.013 0.065 0.118 0.026 0.103 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 242.157***     328.416***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated Managers in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: Offshoring: 
dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI to high-
income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: share of 
intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling for 
high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of the 
total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross wage): 
logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C14. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, for the occupational group “Professionals” (observa-
tion period: 1997-2010, only tertiary educated) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.258*** 0.028 0.087** 0.348*** 0.085 0.220*** 
 [4.43] [0.64] [2.23] [3.50] [1.17] [3.19] 
Offshoring_high 0.057 0.113*** 0.131*** 0.420*** 0.038 0.097 
 [0.79] [2.66] [3.14] [2.83] [0.31] [0.81] 
Outsourcing -0.286 -1.126 -0.823 0.684 0.113 0.245 
 [-0.49] [-1.38] [-1.11] [0.57] [0.36] [0.81] 
Outsourcing_high 0.504 1.165 1.233 -0.578 -0.133 -0.137 
 [0.73] [1.28] [1.46] [-0.42] [-0.40] [-0.40] 
High 0.039 0.033* 0.042** 0.051* 0.001 0.012 
 [1.36] [1.74] [2.45] [1.89] [0.05] [0.72] 
log(capital per emp) -0.016* 0.012 0.012 0.014* -0.005 0.004 
 [-1.74] [1.31] [1.56] [1.91] [-0.75] [0.70] 
log(tfp) -0.050*** -0.044*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.064*** -0.055*** 
 [-4.17] [-3.72] [-5.68] [-4.73] [-6.19] [-6.52] 
log(export value) 0.002 0.001 0.002* 1.020E-04 0.002 0.001 
 [0.76] [0.71] [1.72] [0.041] [1.11] [0.72] 
log(gross wage) 0.327*** 0.055*** 0.107*** 0.344*** 0.076*** 0.144*** 
 [8.83] [2.69] [5.49] [14.6] [4.75] [9.63] 
log(domestic costs) 0.150*** 0.068*** 0.116*** 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 
 [14.0] [4.98] [13.6] [7.21] [4.16] [7.80] 
Constant -4.256*** -1.199*** -2.367*** -3.232*** -1.426*** -1.583*** 
 [-8.35] [-3.38] [-8.75] [-12.3] [-2.60] [-8.01] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.066 0.058  0.026 0.019 
R-squared (between)  0.199 0.318  0.056 0.188 
R-squared (overall) 0.325 0.196 0.303 0.207 0.067 0.194 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 288.775***     371.799***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated Professionals in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: 
Offshoring: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward 
FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: 
share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling 
for high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of 
the total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross 
wage): logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations  
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Table C15. The effect of outsourcing and offshoring on the skill share in Slovenian 
manufacturing and service firms, for the occupational group “Technicians” (observation 
period: 1997-2010, only tertiary educated) 
  Manufacturing firms Service firms 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE RE 
Offshoring 0.195*** 0.048 0.089** 0.378*** 0.052 0.180** 
 [3.68] [1.28] [2.55] [3.57] [0.53] [2.19] 
Offshoring_high -0.141** 0.062 0.060 0.155 0.139 0.189* 
 [-2.28] [1.49] [1.51] [0.98] [1.16] [1.77] 
Outsourcing -1.068* -0.011 -0.004 0.455 0.147 0.440 
 [-1.81] [-0.02] [-0.01] [0.56] [0.32] [1.04] 
Outsourcing_high 2.164** 0.121 0.573 -0.343 0.221 0.091 
 [2.10] [0.19] [0.97] [-0.41] [0.49] [0.21] 
High 0.018 0.002 0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 
 [0.51] [0.07] [0.34] [-0.041] [-0.25] [-0.76] 
log(capital per emp) 0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.002 -0.020** -0.009 
 [0.30] [-0.80] [0.02] [0.29] [-2.49] [-1.43] 
log(tfp) -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.078*** -0.087*** -0.083*** 
 [-2.80] [-3.92] [-5.38] [-6.38] [-7.33] [-9.10] 
log(export value) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 [-0.50] [-1.11] [-0.74] [0.88] [0.26] [0.37] 
log(gross wage) 0.224*** 0.088*** 0.120*** 0.259*** 0.068*** 0.123*** 
 [7.22] [3.73] [5.69] [10.6] [4.07] [8.21] 
log(domestic costs) 0.173*** 0.058*** 0.120*** 0.133*** 0.065*** 0.110*** 
 [15.4] [3.81] [12.3] [13.6] [5.03] [14.4] 
Constant -4.653*** -1.139*** -1.903*** -4.008*** -0.291 -1.976*** 
 [-13.5] [-3.02] [-3.71] [-15.5] [-0.96] [-9.39] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,919 18,919 18,919 29,591 29,591 29,591 
R-squared (within)  0.056 0.049  0.025 0.019 
R-squared (between)  0.139 0.249  0.047 0.129 
R-squared (overall) 0.260 0.133 0.244 0.135 0.048 0.126 
Sargan-Hansen statistics 248.219***     284.611***   
Note. Econometric methods: Pooled OLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects. 
Dependent variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio between skilled employees and the total number of employees, 
where tertiary educated Technicians in ISCO-88 classification are defined as skilled. Explanation of variables: 
Offshoring: dummy variable, controlling for outward FDI; Offshoring_high: dummy variable, controlling for outward 
FDI to high-income countries; Outsourcing: share of intermediate imports in the total material costs; Outsourcing_high: 
share of intermediate imports from high-income countries in the total material costs; High: dummy variable, controlling 
for high-income countries; log(capital per emp): logarithm of the capital per employee in a firm; log(tfp): logarithm of 
the total factor productivity per employee in a firm; log(export value): logarithm of the value of exports; log(gross 
wage): logarithm of the average annual gross wage level; log(domestic costs): logarithm of the domestic cost level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust t-statistics in brackets, the analysis used cluster-robust standard errors. 
Source: SORS, author’s calculations 
